This paper provides a novel analytical characterization of the dynamics of a canonical model of lumpy microeconomic adjustment in the presence of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. The dynamics of the …rm-size distribution are shown to have an intuitive partial-adjustment representation for which the rate of convergence equals the rate of adjustment. Interestingly, analytical approximations nonetheless imply aggregate dynamics that are almost neutral. This neutrality is shown to emerge from a symmetry property in the implied distributional dynamics, and arises even in the absence of general equilibrium adjustment. Quantitative illustrations based on the employment adjustment literature con…rm these analytical results.
Inaction in microeconomic adjustment is pervasive. A stylized fact of the empirical dynamics of employment, investment and prices is that they exhibit periods of inaction punctured by bursts of adjustment.
1 A leading explanation of this phenomenon is that …rms face a …xed cost of adjusting. 2 In such an environment, …rms will choose not to adjust for some time, with periodic discrete adjustments in response to su¢ ciently large shocks, consistent with the empirical "lumpiness"of microeconomic dynamics.
In this paper, we analyze the aggregate implications of this lumpiness at the microeconomic level. We do so in the context of a canonical model of …xed adjustment costs in the presence of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks that has been used widely in prior literature. For concreteness, we focus on the case of employment adjustment, although the model can be applied equally to investment and price dynamics.
We establish two key results that form the basis of the paper. First, we provide a novel analytical characterization of the aggregate steady-state and dynamic outcomes implied by the model, which are shown in general to take on a partial-adjustment representation. Second, analytical approximations to model outcomes reveal that both aggregate steadystate outcomes and aggregate dynamics are neutral with respect to a small …xed adjustment cost.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 1, we describe the basic ingredients of the model. Firms face shocks to labor productivity that induce changes in their desired level of employment. Firms are subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Aggregate shocks drive macroeconomic expansions and recessions; idiosyncratic shocks drive heterogeneity in employment dynamics across …rms. Due to the presence of a …xed adjustment cost, however, …rms'employment will not adjust in response to all shocks. Instead, employment evolves according to an Ss policy at the microeconomic level, remaining constant for intervals of time with occasional jumps to a new level.
Given this environment, Section 2 develops the …rst of the main results of the paper. Speci…cally, it takes on the task of aggregating the lumpy microeconomic behavior identi…ed in section 1 up to the macroeconomic level. These aggregate implications are not obvious. Since individual …rms follow highly nonlinear Ss labor demand policies, and face heterogeneous idiosyncratic productivities, there is no representative …rm interpretation of the model. We show how it is possible to infer the dynamics of aggregate employment by solving for the dynamics of a related object, namely the cross-sectional distribution of employment across …rms. By applying a simple mass-balance approach, we provide an analytical characterization of the distribution dynamics of employment. Two aspects of the result are novel in the context of previous research. First, it holds for a comparatively wide class of processes for shocks and adjustment rules.
3 Second, and perhaps more importantly, our characterization of aggregate dynamics admits a particularly clean economic interpretation. In particular, we show that the evolution of the …rm-size distribution displays partial-adjustment type dynamics, continually evolving toward a steady state that varies over time with aggregate shocks. Interestingly, the rate of convergence of this process has the intuitive property of being equal to the probability that a …rm adjusts away from its current level of employment. These dynamics of the distribution of employment across …rms in turn shape the evolution of aggregate employment, since the latter is simply the mean of that distribution. Section 3 uses this characterization of aggregate employment dynamics to develop the second main result of the paper-approximate aggregate neutrality. In particular, we use the general results of section 2 to inform analytical approximations to model outcomes in the presence of a small …xed adjustment cost. This is a compelling neighborhood to study because, as noted since Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Mankiw (1985) , even small adjustment costs will induce substantial inaction in microeconomic adjustment. In this neighborhood, we show that both the steady-state and the dynamics of the …rm-size distribution coincide with their frictionless counterparts. It follows that the same approximate neutrality extends to the behavior of aggregate employment in general.
We show that this approximate neutrality result can be traced to a symmetry property that emerges in the distributional dynamics of employment as the adjustment friction becomes small. The mass-balance approach of section 2 makes the intuition for this symmetry particularly transparent. Speci…cally, the change over time in the mass of …rms at a given level of employment can be decomposed into an in ‡ow of …rms that adjusts to that level, less an out ‡ow of …rms that adjust away from that level of employment. The key is that 3 Prior literature that has studied aggregation has focused on cases in which shocks are governed by speci…c processes (for example, Brownian motion in the case of Bertola and Caballero, 1990) or particular adjustment rules (such as the one-sided Ss case considered by Caballero and Engel, 1991) . It should be noted, however, that both of the latter papers analyze environments that are more general than ours in other dimensions. Bertola and Caballero (1990) study the case with both …xed and kinked adjustment costs; Caballero and Engel (1991) allow for "structural" heterogeneity in individual …rms'policy rules. a …xed adjustment cost reduces both of these ‡ows. Fewer …rms will adjust away from a given employment level. But, in addition, fewer …rms will …nd it optimal to adjust to that employment level. For small frictions, these two forces are symmetric, and therefore cancel, leaving the evolution of the distribution of employment approximately equal to its frictionless counterpart.
This neutrality result is reminiscent of Caplin and Spulber (1987) who obtain a similar outcome in a related pricing problem. Although they consider a much simpler environment without idiosyncratic shocks and only one-sided adjustment, our result retains a ‡avor of theirs. Speci…cally, Caplin and Spulber demonstrate that a uniform cross-sectional distribution will be invariant in their model due to a form of symmetry-…rms induced to adjust from the bottom of the distribution to the top exactly replace …rms displaced from the top of the distribution. Thus, one interpretation of our neutrality result is that generalizes the Caplin and Spulber insight to an environment with idiosyncratic risk and two-sided adjustment. By the same token, this helps to explain why Golosov and Lucas (2007) …nd small aggregate e¤ects in their quantitative analysis of a related model with these ingredients.
An interesting feature of our approximate aggregate invariance result is that it holds even in partial equilibrium; that is, it does not rely on general equilibrium adjustment of wages. This contrasts with an in ‡uential recent literature that has emphasized role of price adjustment in muting the aggregate e¤ects of …xed adjustment costs (see, for example, Khan and Thomas, 2008; Veracierto, 2002; House, 2008) . Rather, the near-symmetry in the equilibration of the distribution of …rm size holds for any con…guration of market prices.
In section 4 of the paper, we illustrate these analytical results in a series of quantitative illustrations. We …rst calibrate the model using estimates from recent literature on employment adjustment and …rm productivity (Bloom, 2009; Willis, 2005, 2007; Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson, 2008) . Numerical results reveal that this parameterization of the model implies aggregate employment dynamics that are very close to their frictionless analogue, in line with the approximate-neutrality result in section 3.
There remains a lack of consensus over some of the parameters of the model, however, so we also explore the sensitivity of this baseline result to alternative parameterizations. Interestingly, we …nd that the dynamics of aggregate employment can display a modest hump shape in response to aggregate shocks in the case where the adjustment cost is larger relative to the variance of innovations to idiosyncratic productivity. The latter …nding dovetails with the large literature on adjustment costs. Similar numerical results are reported in Bertola and Caballero (1990) , King and Thomas (2006) , who consider a model with much smaller idiosyncratic variance, and Bachmann (2009) , who considers a model with a smaller adjustment rate. By highlighting the interpretation of the adjustment probability as the rate of convergence of the …rm-size distribution, the general result of section 2 reveals the root cause of these …ndings: Larger frictions and smaller idiosyncratic risk both induce smaller adjustment rates, slowing convergence to steady state. 4 In the closing sections of the paper, we extend the model to allow for asymmetric adjustment costs and alternative stochastic processes. For much of the paper, we assume a lump-sum cost of adjustment. As a result, the cost of adjusting up to some level of employment is equal to the cost of adjusting down to that level; this helps preserve symmetry of the distributional dynamics. As we show in Section 4, other formulations of the …xed cost (for instance, where the cost is scaled with …rm productivity) break this symmetry and lead to slightly di¤erent aggregate dynamics.
In addition, a few recent papers have considered a Poisson-like process for productivity in which …rms draw a new value with some probability each period (Gertler and Leahy, 2008; Midrigan, forthcoming) . This induces an atom in the conditional distribution of idiosyncratic productivity at its lagged value. We show that this discontinuity in turn breaks the symmetry of the distributional dynamics. In fact, in an instructive special case, we show analytically that it breaks symmetry in a precise way: it induces a pure partial-adjustment process for aggregate employment, very much akin to that which emerges in a Calvo model.
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We conclude by highlighting promising avenues of future research in the light of our …ndings. One clear message is that the role of the magnitude of adjustment frictions relative to idiosyncratic uncertainty in shaping implied aggregate dynamics emphasizes the value of obtaining robust estimates of these parameters. Beyond this, though, the unifying theme of symmetry that underlies the results of this paper provides two further directions to pursue. First, more work that assesses the presence of asymmetries in …rms'adjustment policies and their contribution to deviations from frictionless dynamics would be worthwhile. 6 Second, 4 For completeness, we also conduct a general-equilibrium analysis of the model. We …nd that equilibrium wage adjustment does partially undo hump-shaped responses of employment to aggregate innovations in calibrated versions of the model where the cost of adjusting is relatively large. This appears consistent with King and Thomas's (2006) analysis of aggregate employment and Khan and Thomas's (2007) study of aggregate investment. Thus, although symmetry fails to a degree under a large-cost calibration, the force of general equilibrium can still induce nearly frictionless dynamics. 5 In their analysis of a related menu-cost model, Gertler and Leahy (2008) …nd that this Poisson-like process implies an approximate Phillips curve that is isomorphic to that in a Calvo model. Our analysis formalizes the intuition behind this result. Speci…cally, we show that the symmetry, and hence also the neutrality we emphasize in the early sections of the paper hold for all …rms except those prevented from adjusting by the Poisson friction. It follows that the approximate law of motion for the distribution of …rm size obeys a partial-adjustment process with a constant rate of convergence, just like Calvo dynamics. 6 A particularly interesting possibility is that the asymmetry in the adjustment hazards estimated by Haltiwanger (1995, 1997 ) plays a role in aggregate outcomes.
further empirical research into the distributional form of idiosyncratic shocks also will shed an important light on the aggregate consequences of …xed adjustment costs.
The Firm' s Problem
We consider a canonical model of …xed employment adjustment costs. Time is discrete. Firms use labor, n, to produce output according to the production function, y = pxF (n), where p represents the state of aggregate labor demand, x represents shocks that are idiosyncratic to an individual …rm, and the function F is increasing and concave, F n > 0 and F nn < 0. We assume that the evolution of idiosyncratic shocks is described by the continuous density function g (x 0 jx) with associated distribution function G (x 0 jx).
At the beginning of a period, …rms observe the realization of their idiosyncratic shocks x, as well as aggregate productivity p. Given this, they then make their employment decision. If the …rm chooses to adjust the size of its workforce, it incurs a …xed adjustment cost, denoted C.
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For the purposes of the main text, we focus on the case in which there is no exogenous attrition of a …rm's workforce, so that during periods of inaction employment remains unchanged. We do this to economize on notation and to convey ideas transparently. The Appendix shows that all the results we present continue to hold for the case with attrition.
It follows that we can characterize the expected present discounted value of a …rm's pro…ts recursively as:
where 1 1 [n 6 = n 1 ] is an indicator that equals one if the …rm adjusts and zero otherwise. The wage w is determined in a competitive labor market, and is taken as exogenous from the …rm's perspective. 9 The variable summarizes the aggregate state of the economy, including 7 It is common in the literature to scale the adjustment cost so that, when coupled with other assumptions on the stochastic process of x, this scaling makes the problem homogeneous in x, thereby allowing one to eliminate a state variable (see, for example, Engel, 1999, and Gertler and Leahy, 2008) . We instead focus on a pure lump-sum adjustment cost for two reasons. First, it simpli…es the analytics. Second, it serves to highlight that our results do not rely on homogeneity of the value function. In section 4, we discuss the quantitative implications of a scale-dependent cost, and contrast them with results for the lump-sum case. 8 We adopt the convention of denoting lagged values with a subscript, 1 , and forward values with a prime, 0 . 9 In a frictionless model, of course, perfect mobility among workers is su¢ cient to support a law of one wage. One may wonder if this remains true in our application. It may appear, for instance, that a worker is able to hold up a …rm and demand a higher wage, since her departure may force the …rm to pay an the aggregate shock p, the wage w, and all variables that are informative with respect to their future evolution.
For the analysis that follows, it is helpful to recast the …rm's problem in equation (1) into two related underlying Bellman equations. In particular, the value of adjusting (gross of the adjustment cost), (x; ), and the value of not adjusting, 0 (n 1 ; x; ), are given by
Clearly, the value of the …rm (n 1 ; x; ) is simply the upper envelope of these two regimes,
In keeping with the literature on …xed adjustment costs, we assume that the optimal labor demand policy takes an Ss form.
10 Figure 1 illustrates such a policy. It is characterized by three functions, L(n; ) < X(n; ) < U (n; ). In the event that the …rm chooses to adjust away from n 1 , optimal employment is determined by a "reset" function X(n; ) which satis…es the …rst-order condition
It follows that the labor demand schedule, conditional on adjusting, is X 1 (x; ). In other words, the reset function is the (conditional) inverse labor demand schedule. Due to the adjustment cost, however, the …rm will not always choose to adjust: It will decide to adjust only if the value of adjusting, net of the adjustment cost, (x; ) C, exceeds the value of not adjusting, 0 (n 1 ; x; ). This aspect of the …rm's decision rule adjustment cost. This strategy is feasible only if the present discounted value of work among …rms that are hiring exceeds that at her present …rm. We will see in equation (5), however, that …rms hire until the value of the marginal worker is zero. Thus, marginal hires yield no rents. It follows that all workers at all …rms are paid just enough to make them indi¤erent between work and non-work. Moreover, if …rms cannot commit, this contract must be implemented as a period-by-period, economy-wide wage. 10 It is well-known that it is di¢ cult to prove the optimality of the Ss policy in general models of a …xed adjustment cost. Exceptions are the continuous-time Brownian case considered by Harrison, Sellke and Taylor (1983) , and the case of one-sided adjustment, in which the variable under control may be adjusted only in one direction (see Scarf, 1959, and Roys, 2010) . However, we show in the Appendix (Lemma 2) that the optimal labor demand policy is well-approximated by its myopic ( = 0) counterpart. A useful implication is that, since we know the optimal myopic policy takes the Ss form, we also know that the Ss policy is approximately optimal for the context of this paper. is characterized by two adjustment "triggers," L (n 1 ; ) and U (n 1 ; ). For su¢ ciently bad realizations of the idiosyncratic shock, x < L (n 1 ; ), the …rm will shed workers; for su¢ ciently good shocks, x > U (n 1 ; ), it will hire workers. For intermediate values of
x 2 [L (n 1 ; ) ; U (n 1 ; )], the …rm will neither hire nor …re, and n = n 1 . Thus, the adjustment triggers trace out the locus of points for which the …rm is indi¤erent between adjusting and not adjusting. It follows that the triggers therefore satisfy the value-matching conditions (L (n 1 ; ) ; ) C = 0 (n 1 ; L (n 1 ; ) ; ) , and (6)
Firms' optimal labor demand policies clearly depend on the aggregate state . For example, positive shocks to p will cause the Ss policy in Figure 1 to shift downward: For any given level of idiosyncratic productivity, a …rm will be less likely to …re, and more likely to hire in an aggregate expansion. For notational simplicity, however, we suppress the dependence of the optimal labor demand policy on in what follows.
An Aggregation Theorem
In this section, we describe the …rst key result of the paper, which develops an analytical approach that allows one to aggregate microeconomic behavior to the macroeconomic level when …rms face a …xed cost of adjusting the size of their workforces. Aggregation in this context is non-trivial. As we have seen, under the Ss policy described above, each individual …rm's labor demand depends in a highly nonlinear fashion on both their individual lagged employment n 1 , as well the realization of their idiosyncratic shock x. Since …rms are heterogeneous in these state variables, it follows that there is no simple representative …rm interpretion of the model.
In order to infer the implications of lumpy microeconomic adjustment for aggregate employment, we …rst obtain a characterization of a related object-the cross-sectional distribution of employment across …rms. We denote the density of the latter by h (n), and its associated distribution function by H (n). This aids aggregation since the mean of this distribution re ‡ects aggregate employment, which in turn allows one to infer aggregate labor demand, and thereby aggregate labor market equilibrium.
We construct this distribution by applying a mass-balance approach. The change in the mass of …rms with employment below some level n is simply equal to the in ‡ow into the mass H(n) less the out ‡ow from that mass. The results of applying this logic are summarized in Proposition 1, which provides a mapping between the density of "mandated" employment h (n) that would be realized if the adjustment cost were momentarily suspended, and the implied density in the presence of adjustment costs.
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Proposition 1 The density of employment across …rms evolves according to the di¤erence equation
where h (n) is the associated steady-state density given by
h (n) is the density of mandated employment; G ( j ) Pr [x jn 1 = ] is the distribution function of idiosyncratic productivity conditional on start-of-period employment; and
is the distribution function of start-of-period employment conditional on the current realization of idiosyncratic productivity.
Proposition 1 reveals that the dynamics of the density of employment across …rms take on a partial-adjustment representation. The density h (n) is continually evolving toward a (potentially time-varying) steady-state density h (n). The latter re ‡ects the distribution of employment that would be attained if the aggregate state p remained at its current level forever. Intuitively, aggregate shocks shift …rms' optimal labor demand policy function in Figure 1 , which in turn shifts the steady-state density h (n) to which the labor market converges. In what follows, we show that each of the components of Proposition 1 admits a very intuitive economic interpretation.
We begin by describing the form of the steady-state density in equation (8). The result states that the steady-state density of employment h(n) is proportional to the density of mandated employment h (n). To understand the factor of proportionality in (8), it is instructive to consider …rst the special case in which the idiosyncratic shocks faced by the …rm are i.i.d. across time. In that case, a …rm's lagged employment n 1 provides no information on the distribution of its current productivity x, and vice versa. It follows that the steady-state density of employment in equation (8) takes the simpler form
11 We borrow the term "mandated" employment from Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995) .
where H (n) is the associated steady-state distribution function. Thus, h (n) in this case satis…es a functional di¤erential equation-h (n) = H 0 (n) is related to H( ) evaluated at two di¤erent points (or, deviated arguments) in its domain. Each component of the ratio in equation (9) has clear economic content. Consider …rst the denominator in equation (9)
Inspection of the illustration of the policy function depicted in Figure 1 reveals that this is simply the probability that a …rm with employment level n adjusts away from n. The numerator of equation (9) may also be interpreted in a similar fashion. Consider a …rm that draws an idiosyncratic productivity level x = X(n). Absent an adjustment cost, such a …rm would adjust to an employment level of n. In the presence of an adjustment cost, however, Figure 1 reveals that the …rm's decision to adjust or not will depend on the level of employment the …rm has inherited from the past. Firms whose initial employment is either relatively low (n 1 < U 1 X (n)) or relatively high (n 1 > L 1 X (n)) will adjust to n. It follows that the numerator of equation (9) is simply the probability that a …rm with productivity x = X(n) adjusts to n.
Returning to the general result reported in equation (8), the same interpretation extends to the case with persistent idiosyncratic shocks. The probability of adjusting away from n, for instance, is modi…ed only to re ‡ect the fact that, when x is persistent, the initial value of …rm size conveys information about the position of past productivity. Therefore, the probability of events, x U (n) or x L (n), must be calculated conditional on n. It follows that the probability of adjusting away from n is now
with G de…ned above. The same idea applies to the probability of adjusting to n.
To summarize, then, equation (8) may be restated simply as
This is a very intuitive result: It simply states that, if a …rm is more likely to adjust to n than it is to adjust away from n, then the distribution of employment will accumulate more mass at n relative to its mandated counterpart.
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These observations in turn provide a means to interpret the transition dynamics out of steady state in equation (7). As we have noted, these dynamics take a partial-adjustmenttype form. In the light of the discussion above, however, we can interpret the rate at which the density converges to steady state in equation (7)
, simply as the probability that a …rm adjusts away from an employment level of n. The result that emerges, then, is that the response of the density of employment to aggregate shocks will be more persistent in the presence of …xed adjustment costs relative to its frictionless counterpart, and the degree of this persistence is mediated through the magnitude of a …rm's probability of adjusting.
Proposition 1 also aids aggregation of the model, since it provides a clear link from microeconomic behavior in the model to the aggregate outcomes implied by that behavior. Speci…cally, once one knows the optimal labor demand policy used by individual …rms, as summarized by the functions L(n) < X(n) < U (n), the evolution of the distribution of employment in the aggregate is determined according to equations (7) and (8). In turn, this allows one to trace out the evolution of the aggregate demand for labor, which is implied by the mean of h(n).
In particular, the optimal labor demand policy analyzed in section 1 is de…ned implicitly for a given level of the market wage w. Thus, the solution for the steady-state distribution of employment in (8) also is indexed implicitly by w. Making that dependence explicit, one can express the steady-state aggregate demand for labor as
Out of steady state, movements in the aggregate state generate movements in the Ss policy functions L (n), X (n) and U (n). This sequence of policy functions induces a sequence of steady-state employment densities h (n), which in turn feeds into a realized path of actual employment densities h (n) according the di¤erence equation (7). When combined with a model of labor supply, our aggregation result therefore allows one to determine the dynamics and stready state of equilibrium employment and wages.
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We are not the …rst to consider the analytics of aggregating lumpy microeconomic behavior. Caballero and Engel (1991) consider a quite general environment in which individual …rms' adjustment rules can di¤er-in their responsiveness to aggregate shocks and in the degree of inaction-what Caballero and Engel term as "structural heterogeneity," which is absent in our model. However, their focus is on the implications of one-sided Ss policies where the variable under control is adjusted only in one direction; Proposition 1 holds for the more general case of two-sided adjustment. Bertola and Caballero (1990) consider aggregate dynamics in a model that allows for a rich structure of …xed and kinked adjustment costs, as well as two-sided adjustment. What is less general in their model, though, is that shocks are restricted to follow a Brownian motion; Proposition 1 holds for a general discrete-time Markov process for idiosyncratic shocks. 14 Our sense, however, is that the most novel aspect of Proposition 1 is its simplicity and interpretability. The partial-adjustment representation of the implied distribution dynamics of h (n), the characterization of the steady-state distribution h (n) in terms of in ‡ow and out ‡ow probabilities, and the interpretation of the rate of convergence to steady state as the probability of adjustment all are new to the literature, to our knowledge.
Approximate Aggregate Neutrality
The previous section provided a general analytical characterization of the aggregate dynamics implied by a model of lumpy microeconomic adjustment. In this section, we derive analytical approximations to model outcomes in the case of a small …xed adjustment cost. Such a case is particularly instructive because it is well-known that even small adjustment frictions imply substantial inaction, and hence lumpiness, in microeconomic adjustment (see, for example, Akerlof and Yellen, 1985, and Mankiw, 1985) . Lemma 1 in the Appendix reiterates this point by showing that the adjustment triggers and their inverses that feature prominently in Proposition 1 can be approximated by
The functions (n) > 0 and (x) > 0 re ‡ect the curvature of the return to adjusting and are linked by the change of variables relation (n) = X 0 (n) [X (n)] that maps units of n to units of x. Thus, second-order small adjustment costs generate …rst-order inaction bands.
We will see in what follows that these analytical approximations give rise to the second key result of the paper:
More generally, in addition to the above-cited papers, aggregation in models of lumpy adjustment can be derived using the Kolmogorov equations (see, for example, Dixit, 1993, and Dixit and Pindyck, 1994 ). An example of the application of these methods for the case of irreversible investment can be found in Bertola and Caballero (1994a) . 15 To facilitate the analytical approximations that underlie Proposition 2, we impose that the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks g (x 0 jx) is analytic in what follows. In section 4, we examine the e¤ects of a compoundPoisson process of shocks that has been proposed in recent literature (Gertler and Leahy, 2008; Midrigan, forthcoming) .
Proposition 2 To a …rst-order approximation around C = 0, the evolution of the distribution of employment across …rms is given by
which is the frictionless law of motion.
The approximation result in Proposition 2 implies that both the steady state and the dynamics of the distribution of employment across …rms are second order in the adjustment friction. In the neighborhood of a small adjustment cost, the steady-state …rm-size distribution coincides with its frictionless 16 counterpart, h (n) h (n), and the dynamics of h (n) are approximately jump. As a result, any gap between the distribution of employment and its frictionless counterpart is closed almost immediately-the aggregate dynamics of the model coincide with frictionless dynamics. Put another way, aggregate outcomes are approximately neutral with respect to a small positive adjustment cost. Such a result is surprising in the light of the partial-adjustment representation of aggregate dynamics in Proposition 1. We show that the invariance of both steady-state and dynamic outcomes can be traced to a symmetry property in the distributional dynamics of
Consider …rst the steady-state density of employment across …rms. It is again useful to begin with the special case in which idiosyncratic shocks are i.i.d. over time. Inspection of equation (9) reveals that a conjecture that the steady-state distribution of employment coincides with its frictionless counterpart, H (n) = H (n) = G [X (n)], will be con…rmed if the probability of not adjusting away from n is o¤set by the probability of not adjusting to n. Under the conjecture, this requires that
16 That h (n) may now be interpreted as the frictionless density of employment that would result if the adjustment cost were suspended inde…nitely, and not just the distribution mandated by the reset policy if the adjustment cost were suspended momentarily, follows from Lemma 2 in the Appendix. This generalizes a result noted by Gertler and Leahy (2008) to the general processes of idiosyncratic shocks that we consider, namely that the policy function is approximated by its myopic ( = 0) counterpart in the neighborhood of a small adjustment cost. A corollary is that the reset policy X (n) coincides with its frictionless counterpart in this case, and satis…es the frictionless …rst-order condition, pX (n) F n (n) w. It follows that, if the adjustment cost were suspended momentarily, all …rms would choose the frictionless level of employment.
Noting the form of the adjustment triggers in equation (12), a second-order approximation to each side of the latter expression around its frictionless counterpart is given by:
Thus, steady-state neutrality of the distribution of employment holds in the neighborhood of a small adjustment cost. This result stems from a form of symmetry in the labor demand policy: the introduction of an adjustment cost has identical o¤setting e¤ects on the probabilities of adjusting to and from any position n in the distribution. Proposition 2 also suggests that this approximate neutrality extends to the out-of-steadystate dynamics of the density of employment h (n). To understand this, it is helpful to rewrite the law of motion for h (n) in equation (7) more directly in terms of its constituent ‡ows as
Intuitively, the in ‡ow into the density of employment at some level n originates from …rms that have a) received an idiosyncratic shock that leads to a desired employment level of n, and b) inherited an employment level su¢ ciently di¤erent from n such that it is optimal to pay the …xed cost and adjust. Thus, the in ‡ow is equal to the density of …rms that would choose an employment level of n absent the adjustment cost, h (n), times the probability that they will in fact adjust. Likewise, the out ‡ow from the density of employment at n is simply the share of …rms at that level of employment that receives a su¢ ciently large idiosyncratic shock to adjust away from n. Clearly, in steady state, h (n) = 0, and equation (16) yields the steady-state outcome in equation (10). To see how this alternative representation sheds light on the approximate neutrality of the dynamics of h (n), imagine a small …xed adjustment cost is introduced into an otherwise frictionless environment. At any instant of time, the adjustment cost reduces the out ‡ow of mass from any given level of employment n, but also reduces the mass of …rms which …nd it optimal to adjust to that level of employment. For small frictions, we show that these two forces are symmetric and therefore o¤set each other almost exactly, leaving the distribution 17 Our approximation assumes that terms of order greater than C are negligible. In contrast, related studies (for example, Gertler and Leahy, 2008) assume C is second-order small, so that p C is the highest order that is of quantitative importance.
18 For instance, from equation (12) we can write
approximately equal to its frictionless counterpart along the transition path. It is possible to illustrate this argument more formally if we again assume i.i.d. productivity shocks. Relative to the frictionless case, the introduction of an adjustment cost reduces the out ‡ow of mass from n by
] of …rms will choose not to adjust. Likewise, the in ‡ow of mass into n is reduced at each instant by
Of the mass h (n) of …rms for whom n is the desired level of employment, a share
of these …rms will choose not to adjust. Similar to the steady-state case above, a second-order approximation to these two expressions reveals that the reductions in both ‡ows coincide in the presence of a small adjustment cost, and are approximated by
It follows that the frictionless mass at any given n is preserved along the transition path.
It is instructive to consider the economic content of each of the terms in this latter expression for the change in the ‡ows. A key observation is the dual, symmetric roles played by the densities of inherited and desired employment levels, h 1 (n) and h (n). Holding constant h (n), a large density of inherited employment, h 1 (n), implies that many …rms are "trapped"at n, reducing the out ‡ow from that position. But, it also implies that there exist relatively few …rms that have inherited employment levels that are su¢ ciently di¤erent from n to …nd it optimal to adjust to n, reducing the in ‡ow into the mass. Symmetrically, holding constant h 1 (n), a greater mass of desired employment, h (n), implies that fewer …rms …nd it optimal to adjust away from n, reducing the out ‡ow from that point. But, it also will imply that a greater mass of …rms who would prefer to move to n will be prevented from doing so, reducing the in ‡ow into that mass. These two forces o¤set, and approximate dynamic neutrality obtains.
Our neutrality result in Proposition 2 contrasts with similar results in prior literature in an interesting way. Caplin and Spulber (1987) were the …rst to note the possibility of aggregate neutrality in the presence of lumpy microeconomic adjustment in a related pricing problem. They consider a very simple environment without idiosyncratic shocks and one-sided Ss adjustment. Their ingenious result is that an invariant uniform crosssectional distribution will be preserved in such an economy, and that aggregate outcomes are una¤ected by the adjustment cost. Like ours, Caplin and Spulber's result arises from a form of symmetry in the model's distributional dynamics: Common shocks move all …rms in the same direction in the Ss band, and …rms induced to adjust at the bottom of the uniform distribution exactly replace those displaced at the top of the distribution.
Proposition 2 shows that the Caplin and Spulber insight can be generalized approximately to an environment with quite general idiosyncratic heterogeneity, and two-sided adjustment. Interestingly, Golosov and Lucas (2007) add precisely these ingredients to the Caplin and Spulber model. In their calibrations of the model, they …nd very small aggregate e¤ects. However, Golosov and Lucas'result is a numerical one. Proposition 2 formalizes the analytics that underlie this approximate neutrality.
A more recent literature has emphasized the role of general equilibrium price movements in unwinding the aggregate e¤ects of lumpy adjustment (see Khan and Thomas, 2008; Veracierto, 2002; and House, 2008) . It is important to note that the neutrality result in Proposition 2 is quite distinct from these channels. Speci…cally, Proposition 2 suggests that approximate neutrality can hold even in partial equilibrium, that is regardless of aggregate price movements. What is at the heart of Proposition 2 is the symmetry in the distributional dynamics of h (n).
4 Quantitative Analysis
The preceding sections have highlighted two results on the aggregate outcomes of lumpy microeconomic adjustment. In section 2, we provided an analytical characterization of aggregate dynamics implied by Ss employment policies at the …rm level. Proposition 1 revealed that the distribution dynamics take a partial-adjustment form, continually evolving toward a time-varying ‡ow steady state. Section 3 used these analytical results to derive approximations to outcomes in the presence of a small adjustment cost. Proposition 2 revealed that an approximate neutrality result emerges, with aggregate dynamics almost coinciding with their frictionless counterparts, despite substantial microeconomic inaction. A natural question in the light of these results is whether plausible parameterizations of the model imply aggregate dynamics that resemble the approximate results of Proposition 2, or the more general results of Proposition 1. In this section, we address this question by calibrating the model to conventional estimates of its parameters from recent literature.
Calibration
The baseline calibration we analyze is summarized in Table 1 . The numerical model is cast at a quarterly frequency. We adopt the widespread assumption that the production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form, F (n) = n , with < 1. The returns to scale parameter is set equal to 0:64 based on estimates reported in Willis (2005, 2007) . This also is similar to the value assumed by King and Thomas (2006) in their analysis of a related …xed-cost model. The discount factor is set to 0:99, which is the conventional choice for a quarterly model.
The magnitude of the adjustment cost is based on estimates reported in Willis (2005, 2007) and Bloom (2009). Cooper, Haltiwanger and Willis (2005) estimate a model similar to the one described above using plant-level data from the Census' Longitudinal Research Database. They estimate a …xed cost of adjustment equal to approximately 8 percent of quarterly revenue (see row "Disrupt" in their Table 3A) . Using Compustat data, Bloom (2009) …nds nearly the same result (see column "All" in his Table  3 ). Based on this, we calibrate the adjustment cost parameter C to replicate these estimates.
Idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks are assumed respectively to evolve according to the common assumption of geometric AR(1) processes,
where the innovations are independent normal random variables: " Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) report estimates that imply a quarterly persistence rate of x 0:95. We split the di¤erence between these di¤erent estimates by setting x = 0:7 and x = 0:35 for the purposes of the baseline calibration, and examine the sensitivity of the results to alternative calibrations. The baseline calibration is comparable to Bachmann's (2009) analysis of non-convex adjustment costs.
The parameters of the process of aggregate shocks, p and p , are calibrated so that the model approximately replicates the persistence and volatility of (de-trended) log aggregate employment. Using time series data on private payroll employment and detrending using 20 The typical estimate of x in Cooper, Haltiwanger and Willis (2007) the HP …lter, we compute an autocorrelation coe¢ cient of 0:96 and a standard deviation of 0:026. Values of p = 0:95 and p = 0:015 are roughly consistent with these moments (see Table 1 ). We do this because our goal is not to explain the volatility of aggregate employment, but to compare model outcomes within an environment that is economically relevant. One way of doing that is to generate aggregate outcomes that are comparable to what we observe in the data. Lastly, as noted at the conclusion of section 1, we have generalized the analysis of sections 2 and 3 to allow for worker attrition. Accordingly, we have incorporated a constant rate of attrition, , into our quantitative analysis. To calibrate , we use the simple average of the quarterly quit rate from JOLTS. This is 6 percent. 
Labor Supply
In order to solve for the aggregate dynamics and steady state of the model, one must specify the supply side of the market. We consider two assumptions on labor supply. The …rst is that the elasticity of labor supply is equal to unity. This value is similar to what is implied by Chang and Kim's (2006) structural model of indivisible labor supply, and is also the value advocated by Kimball and Shapiro (2010) based on an analysis of survey evidence.
In addition, however, we also explore the implications of the model under the assumption that labor supply is perfectly elastic, so that the wage may be treated as …xed (and given by its value in Table 1) . 22 This case is instructive, as it shuts o¤ any equilibrium adjustment in wages, and thereby allows us to isolate the features of aggregate dynamics solely due to the equilibration of the distribution of employment across …rms, h (n), that we emphasize.
Equilibrium wage adjustment
We introduce an upward-sloped aggregate labor supply schedule of the simple loglinear form
As noted above, we impose that the labor supply elasticity is one, so = 1. The intercept, , is set so that mean equilibrium employment remains near 20, roughly consistent with 21 The Appendix actually shows that the analysis of aggregation and aggregate neutrality may be extended to allow attrition to depend on the aggregate state, so long as it is independent of idiosyncratic productivity, x, and …rm size, n. For simplicity, the quantitative analysis assumes a constant rate of attrition. 22 To clarify: we parameterize the process (18) so that it is consistent with the empirical variation in aggregate log employment, conditional on a labor supply elasticity of one. We do not re-calibrate the model when the elasticity is set to in…nity. This allows us to compare impulse responses given a …xed stochastic process for p. data from County Business Patterns. This aggregate labor supply schedule may be derived from the problem of a large household that must allocate its members across market and non-market work in a setup similar to that used in Mulligan (2001). 23 It is well-known that, in the presence of (19), individual …rms face a di¢ cult prediction problem: Because employment is quasi-…xed, …rms must consider the future consequences of their current employment decisions, and so must forecast the future path of aggregate wages when they decide on the size of their current workforce. Yet the wage depends on aggregate employment, N R nh (n) dn, which in turn depends on the distribution of employment across …rms h (n), an in…nite-dimensional object.
We adopt Krusell and Smith's (1998) bounded rationality algorithm to solve this problem. Speci…cally, we assume that …rms forecast log aggregate employment using its lag, and the current level of log aggregate productivity,
Given the forecast of aggregate employment implied by (20), …rms can then use (19) to forecast future wages. Conditional on this forecast, the …rm solves for its optimal employment policy fL (n) ; X (n) ; U (n)g. Aggregation then follows from Proposition 1, which maps the microeconomic policy rules to the law of motion of the distribution. Speci…cally, if we calculate the optimal policy over a grid of ns, it is then straightforward to use Proposition 1 to track the distribution over this grid from period to period. This enables us to simulate a time series of aggregate employment without the need to directly simulate hundreds of thousands of individual …rms. Once the simulation is complete, we estimate (20) on the simulated aggregate time series, update the coe¢ cients f 0 ; N ; p g, and repeat until convergence.
24 Figure 2A presents the impulse response of aggregate employment implied by the baseline calibration of the model, and compares it with its frictionless counterpart-that is, the case with no adjustment cost (C = 0). Consistent with the result of Proposition 2, the di¤erences between the impulse responses are very small-the adjustment cost does not greatly a¤ect 23 The derivation is straightforward and is available upon request. To summarize the household's problem, members obtain di¤erent levels of disutility from market work, and those members whose disutility falls below a threshold participate in the labor market. The positive slope in (19) re ‡ects the marginal disutility borne by the household when it deploys to the labor market another member, who faces a higher disutility than her predecessors. An assumption implicit in (19) is that members' utility is linear in consumption, which implies that the marginal utility of wealth is …xed at one (and hence absent from (19)). We impose this to ease computational burden, since it implies that there is only one price (the real wage) to track. 24 Although this quasi-analytical method is preferred, we have found virtually the same results when we use a more "brute-force"simulation method. Speci…cally, we specify a …ne grid of idiosyncratic productivity levels and solve for and simulate the discretized joint distribution of (n; x). the response of aggregate employment to aggregate shocks. It follows that the forecast equation (20) is very accurate-estimating the equation on model-generated data yields an R 2 in excess of 0:99999. By the same token, the estimated coe¢ cients are very close to what would be expected from the frictionless model, given the calibration of the labor supply elasticity.
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We next begin to explore the sensitivity of the results to alternative calibrations. Our work here is motivated by (7), which indicates that the degree of partial adjustment in aggregate employment can be traced to the average probability of adjusting across plants. This moment, in turn, is in ‡uenced substantially by the choices of C and x . A higher cost of adjusting, of course, reduces the incidence of adjustment and slows the rate of convergence to steady state after a shock. In addition, a more compressed distribution of productivity (a smaller x ) implies that a …rm is less likely to receive a value of x outside of its inaction band. This also reduces the incidence of adjustment. 26 We anticipate, then, that an increase in C or a reduction in x may induce a degree of persistence in the impulse response absent in Figure 2A .
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Figure 3 reports the impulse responses for "small-x "and "large-C"calibrations. In the former case, x is set to 0:2, so it is at the low end of the range of estimates discussed in section 4.1. This implies a quarterly probability of adjusting that is, on average, a little less than 30 percent. 28 For the "large-C" calibration, we set C so it, too, induces an average probability of adjusting of about the same magnitude. This turns out to require a …xed cost of adjusting that is nearly 32 percent of revenue for the average plant in our simulations (i.e., when averaged across plants over all quarters, C 0:32E (y)). 26 Although a smaller x will compress the inaction band, as less idiosyncratic uncertainty reduces the option value of waiting to adjust, the probability of adjusting nonetheless will fall (see e.g. Bertola and Caballero, 1990) . 27 That the divergence of aggregate outcomes from their frictionless counterparts depends on the size of the adjustment cost relative to the dispersion in idiosyncratic risk is anticipated in Bertola and Caballero (1990) and Caballero and Engel (1991) . Proposition 1 clari…es this channel by revealing that these e¤ects are mediated through the fact that the rate of convergence is equal to the probability of adjusting which in turn depends on magnitude of the adjustment cost and the dispersion of idiosyncratic shocks. 28 Preliminary analysis of micro data in the Bureau of Labor Statistics'Business Employment Dynamics database reveals that the probability of adjusting is closer to 45 percent per quarter, so this calibration induces more inaction than in the data. 29 It is important to note that, although the small-x and large-C calibrations are contrived to imply similar average rates of adjustment, Proposition 1 in fact implies that the whole distribution of adjustment rates over n will determine the degree of propagation in aggregate employment N = R nh (n) dn. Thus, Proposition 1 does not imply that the small-x and large-C calibrations will have identical impulse responses.
sponses. In the small-x calibration, employment remains elevated for the …rst two quarters, but there is no pronounced hump shape. In the large-C calibration, employment actually declines monotonically after the …rst quarter.
Do Figures 2A and 3 in fact con…rm the robustness of our analytical approximations? If so, this suggests that the model's dynamics are driven largely by the partial-equilibrium forces noted in section 3, namely the symmetry of the dynamics of h (n). Or, is it the case that the results in Figures 2A and 3 are driven by the general-equilibrium forces noted by Khan and Thomas (2008) and Veracierto (2002) ? The next subsection takes up this question.
Fixed wages
The implications of general equilibrium in our context are potentially signi…-cant, as price adjustment could blunt the partial-equilibrium implications of …xed adjustment costs for aggregate dynamics. To see how, suppose that, at a given wage, the staggering of adjustment across plants after a positive aggregate shock induces a degree of partial adjustment in aggregate employment. Speci…cally, imagine aggregate employment displays a hump-shaped impulse response in which the peak increase in N occurs after the …rst period. Given the form of the labor supply curve, this would, in general equilibrium, imply a predictable future increase in the real wage even after aggregate productivity has begun its return to steady state. As a result, forward-looking …rms may accelerate the timing of their hiring to take advantage of the temporarily low wage. This "pulls forward" hiring to some degree and may lead to an equilibrium response in employment that more closely resembles the frictionless path.
Reacting to this, we now examine the case in which the elasticity of labor supply is in…nite, so that the wage w is e¤ectively …xed. In doing so, we suppress any equilibrium adjustment of wages along the transition path. Examining the aggregate dynamics of the model in this environment allows us to isolate features of these dynamics that can be traced to the equilibration of the distribution of employment that is at the root of Proposition 2 from those driven by the adjustment of wages in general equilibrium.
With …xed wages, the numerical model is much simpler to solve. In particular, it is no longer necessary to apply the Krusell-Smith bounded rationality algorithm, since the wage no longer needs to be forecasted. Instead, all that needs to be done is to solve for the optimal labor demand policy functions. Since the wage is …xed, the aggregate state is summarized completely by aggregate productivity p, and the optimal policy functions take the simple form L (n; p), X (n; p), and U (n; p). As we noted in section 1, a positive innovation to aggregate productivity p shifts these functions downward-for a given level of idiosyncratic productivity, a …rm is more likely to hire, less likely to …re, and will select a higher level of employment conditional on adjustment. Thus, the evolution of aggregate productivity p induces shifts in the policy function, which, via the law of motion (7), trace out the evolution of the distribution of employment and thereby aggregate employment.
The results of this exercise under the baseline calibration are illustrated in Figure 2B . The impulse response in the presence of adjustment costs continues to lie very close to the frictionless response. Thus, the dynamic neutrality observed in Figure 2A , that allowed for general equilibrium adjustment of prices, appears to derive in large part from the neutrality of the dynamics of the distribution of employment, as opposed to the adjustment of wages. This suggests that the partial-equilibrium neutrality emphasized in Proposition 2 is dominant in the baseline calibration. Figure 4 plots the responses under the "small-x " and "large-C" calibrations. Interestingly, these results do reveal clear, though somewhat modest, hump-shaped dynamics. The di¤erence between Figure 2B and Figure 4 is consistent with our interpretation of (7), which reveals the potential for partial adjustment in cases where the incidence of plant-level adjustment is relatively low. Hence, our small-C analytical approximations serve as a good guide to the dynamics when C is not too large relative to x , in which case the incidence of adjustment is not too large. Furthermore, the di¤erence between Figures 3 and 4 is also consistent with recent literature that has emphasized the potential of general-equilibrium forces to blunt, to some degree, partial adjustment dynamics (Khan and Thomas, 2008; Veracierto, 2002) .
Interestingly, these conclusions dovetail with recent literature on dynamic labor demand that has solved numerical models of …xed adjustment costs under speci…c parametric assumptions. Our …nding that aggregate dynamics are approximately neutral with respect to the …xed adjustment cost in the baseline calibration mirrors the …ndings of Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) , who …nd empirically that aggregation smooths away much of the role of cross-sectional heterogeneity.
Similarly, our results on the role of the magnitude of the adjustment cost relative to idiosyncratic uncertainty also echo prior conclusions based on numerical work. For example, in a model without idiosyncratic productivity shocks, King and Thomas (2006) …nd that the response of aggregate employment displays a slight hump shape, reminiscent of partialadjustment type dynamics. Bachmann (2009) also …nds that a …xed adjustment cost model induces sluggish dynamics in aggregate employment. While his model allows for idiosyncratic risk comparable to that used in this paper, his calibration implies a comparatively low adjustment rate. Thus, the results of both of these papers are consistent with our …nding that it is the magnitude of the adjustment cost relative to idiosyncratic risk that determines the aggregate e¤ects of lumpy adjustment at the microeconomic level.
Size-Dependent Frictions
A unifying theme of the analysis thus far is that symmetries in individual adjustment policies play an important role in neutralizing the aggregate e¤ects of lumpy adjustment. In the light of this, a natural question is whether asymmetries lead to substantial di¤erences in implied macroeconomic responses. A leading example of asymmetric adjustment costs is the case in which the friction is size-dependent, in contrast to the lump-sum cost we have analyzed up to now. Common approaches have been to scale the adjustment cost to be proportional to frictionless revenue (Caballero and Engel, 1999; Gertler and Leahy, 2008) , or to assume a "disruption"cost whereby …rms lose a fraction of revenue when adjustment occurs (Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006 , and Cooper, Haltiwanger and Willis, 2004 , …nd evidence in support of the latter).
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By linking the magnitude of the friction to the size of the …rm, both of these approaches naturally give rise to an asymmetry in adjustment costs-the cost of increasing employment will exceed the cost of reducing it. This raises the trigger for upward adjustments U (n), implying that productivity must be higher than otherwise, relative to X (n), to induce the …rm to add workers. Conversely, since adjusting down implies a smaller cost, the trigger for downward adjustments L (n) does not have to be as low as otherwise, relative to X (n), to induce a …rm to cut employment. Despite this, it is possible to show that approximate symmetry continues to hold in the case of size-dependent frictions, albeit in a "smaller"neighborhood of small adjustment frictions. To be precise, Lemma 4 in the Appendix proves that, in the case where the friction is proportional to frictionless revenue, then symmetry of the adjustment policy holds in the presence of second-order small adjustment costs, as in Gertler and Leahy (2008) . This is in contrast to the case of a lump-sum adjustment cost, where only …rst-order smallness of the friction is required for symmetry. 31 30 Although the disruption cost increases with current revenue, it retains the essential character of a …xed cost-it is discontinuous at the origin ( n = 0). Thus, the cost jumps in…nitely fast when the …rm undertakes adjustment. 31 In the special case in which shocks evolve according to a Brownian motion, and the adjustment cost is scaled in a particular way with …rm size, a homogeneity can emerge that allows adjustment policies to be written as a function of a single state variable, the geometric "gap" between desired and past employment z ln X 1 (x) ln n 1 (see, for example, Caballero and Engel, 1999) . Haltiwanger (1995, 1997) show that in this case average employment growth across …rms can be written as E ( ln n) = R zA (z) f (z) dz, where A (z) is an adjustment function that describes the measure of …rms with desired employment growth z that adjusts to z = 0, and f (z) is the cross-sectional density of the gap z. Since this approach corresponds to a particular special case of our model, it is straightforward to verify approximate As before, the question then becomes a quantitative one: do leading estimates of the adjustment cost place the model in the neighborhood where approximate symmetry continues to hold? The impulse responses plotted in Figure 5 suggest that this is the case. The left panel depicts the case where the adjustment cost is proportional to frictionless revenue; the right panel illustrates the outcomes for a disruption cost. As in the baseline calibration, adjustment costs are set to equal 8 percent of revenue in this exercise; the key di¤erence is that an individual …rm's adjustment cost rises proportionately with that same …rm's revenue in the present context. All other parameters are set equal to their values in Table 1 . It is possible to discern a slight hump shape in the impulse responses in Figure 5 , in contrast to near-frictionless dynamics in the lump-sum case in Figure 2 . However, the deviation from frictionless dynamics is modest. 
Poisson idiosyncratic shocks
An in ‡uential strand of recent research has argued that the form of idiosyncratic shocks plays a crucial role in shaping the aggregate e¤ects of lumpy microeconomic adjustment. In particular, Gertler and Leahy (2008) and Midrigan (forthcoming) have studied environments in which idiosyncratic shocks evolve according to a compound Poisson process whereby individual …rms receive a shock with probability 1 each period. Interestingly, they …nd that this departure gives rise to persistent aggregate dynamics, in contrast to the results of previous sections of this paper.
In what follows, we show that the analysis and intuition of sections 2 and 3 provide a novel perspective on the origins of this result. For clarity, it is helpful to consider the case in which idiosyncratic shocks are conditionally i.i.d. That is, with probability 1 each period …rms receive an independent draw x 0 from a distribution function G (x 0 ), while with probability no idiosyncratic shock arrives and x 0 = x.
As in section 3, our aim is to approximate the reductions in the ‡ows in and out of the mass h (n) relative to a frictionless world in which all …rms adjust every period. 33 Note that these ‡ows essentially are unchanged for the set of …rms that receive an idiosyncratic shock. neutrality using this alternative accounting framework, provided that the adjustment rule A (z) is symmetric in z. From above, the latter will be the case if the adjustment cost is second-order small. 32 The impulse response in the presence of a disruption cost yields a slightly more evident hump shape. This may re ‡ect the fact that, unlike other forms of …xed costs, a disruption cost directly taxes increases in employment (because the cost reduces current revenue). Thus, it is likely to depress the choice of employment, conditional on adjusting, to a greater degree. Still, the deviation from the frictionless path is not dramatic.
33 A subtle but important point is that, even though …rms receive idiosyncratic shocks with probability 1 < 1 each period, they nonetheless will adjust every period in a frictionless world by virtue of the presence of aggregate shocks.
What is di¤erent is that there exists a mass of …rms that receive no idiosyncratic shock, but may adjust to aggregate shocks.
In their model of menu costs, Gertler and Leahy (2008) show that almost none of the latter …rms in fact adjusts in the presence of plausibly small aggregate disturbances. The same is true of our model. To understand why, it is helpful …rst to imagine the model in the absence of aggregate shocks. In that case, a …rm that receives no idiosyncratic shock has no reason to adjust: If their current productivity x = x 1 lies outside of the inaction region [L (n 1 ) ; U (n 1 )], then it must also have done in the past, and the …rm already will have adjusted. All that changes in the presence of aggregate shocks is that the current period's adjustment triggers may di¤er from the previous period's, inducing some …rms on the margin to adjust. When aggregate shocks are small relative to the inaction region, the latter measure of …rms will be small.
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It follows that the reduction in the out ‡ow from n relative to the frictionless case is approximated by
will not adjust away from n; and a share receives no idiosyncratic shock and also does not adjust. Similarly, the reduction in the in ‡ow into n is approximated by
Comparison of the latter with the analysis of the continuous-shock case in section 3 reveals the mechanism at the heart of the persistence induced by the Poisson model. As in section 3, the reductions in the ‡ows associated with …rms that receive idiosyncratic shocks approximately cancel in the presence of a small …xed adjustment cost. What remains, however, are the terms associated with …rms that have not received an innovation to x. Crucially, these ‡ows do not cancel. As a result, the implied approximate aggregate dynamics are given by
What emerges, then, is that aggregate dynamics in the presence of Poisson shocks are approximated by a pure partial-adjustment process, with convergence rate equal to the probability of receiving an idiosyncratic shock, 1
. Equivalently, the model will behave 34 By the same token, among …rms with x = x 1 , a discrete mass will have adjusted in the past and will inherit an employment level of n 1 = X 1 (x 1 ). It follows that aggregate shocks that shift the reset function X ( ) enough to induce even these …rms to adjust in the current period will induce a discretely-large fraction of …rms to adjust. Thus, large aggregate shocks will be more likely to induce neutrality in the presence of Poisson shocks. Karadi and Rei¤ (2012) investigate this possibility in more detail. 35 Recall that the frictionless law of motion is h (n) = [h 1 (n) h (n)]. We have shown that the out ‡ows from n are depressed relative to the frictionless case by h 1 (n) and the in ‡ows to n are depressed by h (n). Thus, we can amend the frictionless law of motion to obtain h (n)
[h 1 (n) h (n)] + h 1 (n) h (n), which yields the expression in the main text. like a Calvo model in which the exogenous probability of adjusting is set to 1
. Since the latter is independent of the level of employment n (in contrast to the continuous-shock case studied above), it follows that aggregate employment will inherit precisely the same partial-adjustment dynamics. Hence, we expect persistent, hump-shaped impulse responses.
To illustrate this point, we calibrate the model with Poisson idiosyncratic shocks and compute the impulse response of aggregate employment to an aggregate productivity innovation. The calibration strategy is straightforward. To maximize similarity with the benchmark model, we leave virtually all of the structural parameters unchanged, and modify the cost of adjustment to guarantee that its average value across …rms remains equal to 8 percent of revenue.
It remains, then, to select the Poisson parameter . Since any > 0 necessarily lowers the probability of adjusting ceteris paribus, we compare the Poisson case with a calibration of the benchmark model that implies a comparably small adjustment probability. To that end, we …nd that = 0:45 induces a probability of adjusting in the Poisson model that is similar to that in the low-x calibration of the benchmark model depicted in Figure 4A . Figure 6 illustrates the results. Consistent with the results of Gertler and Leahy (2008) and Midrigan (forthcoming), one can clearly discern much more persistent aggregate dynamics in this case, with employment converging to its frictionless counterpart after …ve quarters.
36 Moreover, the persistence cannot be attributed to a lower average adjustment probability-as mentioned above, the low-x calibration in Figure 4A induces a similar adjustment rate but exhibits much less propagation. Rather, the persistence is closely linked to the above intuition for the approximate partialadjustment nature of the model's dynamics in the presence of Poisson shocks. To emphasize this point, Figure 6 also plots the path of aggregate employment directly from (21) as a point of comparison with the model-generated path. Remarkably, the two paths are almost indistinguishable, suggesting that the approximate analysis above provides a very good guide to the behavior of the model.
The source of this result can be traced to a violation of the symmetry noted in section 3. There we highlighted the dual, symmetric roles of the distributions of inherited and desired employment, h 1 (n) and h (n), in delivering aggregate neutrality in the presence of continuous shocks. For instance, while it seems clear that h 1 (n) is indicative of the mass of …rms that is deterred from adusting away from n; a more subtle point is that it also 36 Numerically, Midrigan (forthcoming) …nds that an AR(1) speci…cation for the law of motion of the log price level is very accurate. This of course is precisely the implication of the analytical approximation in (21). Moreover, Midrigan's simulated degree of persistence (see his Table III) contributes to the size of the reduction in the probability of adjusting to n. The reason is that …rms whose initial employment is near n (mass in the neighborhood of h 1 (n)) do not …nd it optimal to adjust to that position. Hence, what underlies this latter, symmetric e¤ect is the fact that a …rm's propensity to adjust (to n) depends on its initial size. The model with Poisson shocks breaks this symmetry because the arrival of new idiosyncratic shocks is independent of the …rm's state. As a result, a fraction of …rms does not adjust regardless of their initial employment, a feature reminiscent of the Calvo model.
The latter discussion reveals a connection between our notion of symmetry in distributional dynamics on the one hand, and the "selection e¤ect" highlighted by Golosov and Lucas (2007) on the other. The selection e¤ect refers to the notion that the propensity to adjust is linked to the size of the desired adjustment. As we have said, this notion underlies the dual, symmetric roles of h 1 (n) (and h (n)). Thus, one can say that the assumption of Poisson shocks breaks symmetry because it weakens the selection e¤ect. The notion of symmetry that we highlight can therefore be thought of as providing a formal way to trace through the analytical implications of the selection e¤ect for aggregate dynamics. 
Summary and Discussion
Our analysis of the aggregate implications of a canonical model of …xed employment adjustment costs has established two main results. First, the dynamics of aggregate employment in the presence of an adjustment friction can be inferred simply and intuitively by characterizing the evolution of the distribution of employment across …rms. We show that the latter displays partial-adjustment type dynamics with the intuitive property that the rate of convergence is equal to the rate of adjustment from each employment level. Second, we show that, to a …rst-order approximation, aggregate employment dynamics coincide with their frictionless counterpart. This result arises from a form of symmetry in the dynamics of the …rm-size distribution that emerges as the adjustment cost becomes small. In that neighborhood, we show that the probability that a …rm adjusts to a given employment level is approximately o¤set by the probability that a …rm adjusts away from that level, leaving the path of the …rm-size distribution almost unimpaired.
Thus, our analysis provides an analytical foundation to recent quantitative research on the macroeconomic e¤ects of discrete adjustment costs in a general framework. It provides a precise formal justi…cation for the approximate neutrality noted in numerical simulations by Golosov and Lucas (2007) in the context of a related menu cost model. Similarly, our own quantitative analysis of a model of employment adjustment calibrated to leading estimates of adjustment costs imply aggregate dynamics that are close to frictionless outcomes, also in line with our approximate neutrality result.
Our analysis also o¤ers a novel perspective on the circumstances in which aggregate dynamics can be expected to deviate from their frictionless counterparts. First, the interpretation of the rate of adjustment as the rate of convergence in our general analytical results suggests that aggregate dynamics will be more persistent in the presence of a lower frequency of adjustment. Consistent with this, our quantitative results reveal more persistent, humpshaped aggregate dynamics when the …xed adjustment cost is large relative to the magnitude of idiosyncratic shocks facing …rms. This in turn rationalizes the numerical results of King and Thomas (2006) and Bachmann (2009) who …nd more persistent responses in calibrations with lower adjustment rates.
Second, a unifying theme in our …ndings is the important role of symmetry in unwinding the aggregate e¤ects of lumpy adjustment. It follows that deviations from frictionless dynamics can be traced to violations of this symmetry. We show that an important example of the latter is recent research that has invoked compound Poisson processes of idiosyncratic shocks in which only a fraction 1 of …rms receives a shock each period (Gertler and Leahy, 2008; Midrigan, forthcoming) . Our approximations provide a novel perspective on this result: to a …rst order approximation, we demonstrate that implied aggregate dynamics in this case are isomorphic to Calvo adjustment with exogenous adjustment parameter 1 . These results highlight a number of interesting avenues for future research. First, since the magnitude of adjustment costs and idiosyncratic risk play a role in the model's aggregate dynamics, it is remains important for empirical work to focus on obtaining robust estimates of these two critical parameters. Second, we join the in ‡uential recent work of Gertler and Leahy and Midrigan in emphasizing the role of the form of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Given its theoretical importance, future empirical work that estimates the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks will be of particular value.
To the extent that estimates of these parameters line up with the approximate aggregate neutrality we identify, it is worthwhile to consider other adjustment frictions that simultaneously can account for lumpy microeconomic adjustment and persistent aggregate dynamics. For instance, both …xed and kinked (proportional) adjustment costs induce inaction at the microeconomic level, but may have very di¤erent implications for aggregate employment dynamics. In addition, there may be additional frictions, or technological constraints, to which the …rm is subject that interact with adjustment costs. For instance, Bachmann, Caballero, and Engel (2011) consider a model in which there are "core components" to the capital stock whose depreciation must be replaced in order for the plant to operate. They argue that this feature can amplify the e¤ects of a …xed cost of capital adjustment on the aggregate dynamics of investment.
Our framework would suggest that, to the extent these other frictions alter the dynamics, they must disrupt the symmetry of the adjustment policy. And indeed, using plant-level data on employment and investment, the analysis of Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger (1997) does suggest that asymmetries are important empirically. The question of what lies behind this asymmetry-and what it implies for the aggregate dynamics-is thus an important topic for future research.
A Appendix
For ease of exposition, section 1 presented a simple model of …xed adjustment costs. In this appendix, we describe a more elaborate version of the model that allows for exogenous worker attrition at a rate that may depend on the aggregate state. The latter generalization allows us to extend our results to factor adjustment models with depreciation (the case of a constant worker attrition rate) and to canonical menu costs models (which is isomorphic to a case with aggregate-state-dependent attrition). 38 The proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 in what follows hold for this more general case.
Worker attrition is modeled as follows. At the same time as a …rm observes the realization of its idiosyncratic shock x, an exogenous fraction ( ) of its workforce separates. It follows that we can characterize the expected present discounted value of a …rm's pro…ts recursively as:
(ñ 1 ; x; ) max
whereñ 1 (1 ( )) n 1 denotes employment carried into the period, and all other variables are as de…ned in section 1. As in section 1 and the literature on …xed adjustment costs, we continue to assume that the optimal labor demand policy takes an Ss form. The "reset"function X(n) satis…es the …rst-order condition
and the adjustment triggers satisfy the value-matching conditions (L (ñ 1 ; ) ; ) C = 0 (ñ 1 ; L (ñ 1 ; ) ; ) , and
Proof of Proposition 1. We wish to derive the ‡ows in and out of the mass of …rms with employment below some number m, H(m). Consider …rst the in ‡ow into that mass-i.e. the mass of …rms that cuts employment from above m to below m. To derive this ‡ow, …rst …x a level of lagged employment, n 1 and denote the distribution of productivity conditional on lagged employment as G ( j ) Pr [x jn 1 = ]. We can use Figure 1 to identify four potential sets of in ‡ows corresponding to the following cases:
, the probability of reducing employment below m will be
, and m 2 [ñ 1 ; n 1 ], so that n 1 2 m; m 1
, the probability of 38 To elaborate, assume product demand is given by y = (p=P ) Y , where y is demand for the …rm's product, p is the price of the …rm's product, P is the average price level, Y is aggregate purchases, and is the elasticity of demand. To adjust price means that p 6 = p 1 , which, given the demand curve, may be written as y 6 = Y Y 1 P P 1 y 1 Sy 1 . Thus, the price adjustment problem may be written as an output adjustment problem, where S is analogous to the retention rate (1 ) in the labor demand problem. reducing employment below m will be
i , the probability of reducing employment below m will be
i , the probability of reducing employment below m will be G [X (m) jn 1 ].
It follows that the in ‡ow is given by
Following a similar logic, the out ‡ow from the mass H (m) is given by the mass of …rms that raises employment from below m to above m. Similar to above, we can use Figure 1 to identify two potential sets of out ‡ows from H(m):
; m i , the probability of increasing employment above m will be 1
, the probability of increasing employment above m will be 1 G [X (m) jn 1 ]. 5b) If n 1 > X 1 U (ñ 1 ), and m > n 1 , so that n 1 < m, the probability of increasing employment above m will be 1 G [X (m) jn 1 ].
It follows that the out ‡ow is given by
The mass of …rms with employment below some level n this period is equal to the mass below n in the previous period plus in ‡ows into the mass less out ‡ows from the mass. Thus, using equations (25) and (26) we can express the evolution of the distribution function H (n) as
Di¤erentiating, denoting the frictionless density of employment as h (m) g [X (m)] X 0 (m), using Bayes'rule to write the distribution of lagged employment conditional on current productivity as
, and de…ningm (1 ) m yields the stated result,
where the steady-state density satis…es the recursion
Setting = 0 yields the result stated in Proposition 1.
Lemma 1 In the presence of a small …xed adjustment cost, the adjustment triggers and their inverses are approximately equal to
where (ñ) p 2= xx (ñ; X(ñ)), and (x) p 2= 11 (X 1 (x); x). In addition, (ñ) = X 0 (ñ) (X (ñ)).
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof holds for any given aggregate state , and so for transparency we suppress dependence on in what follows. Recall that the adjustment triggers satisfy the value matching condition, (ñ;
In the presence of C 0, we may restrict our focus to a second-order approximation to (ñ; x 0 ) around x 0 = X(ñ):
The …rst and second terms on the right side are zero by optimality. Setting (ñ 1 ; x) = C, it follows that the triggers are as stated in (30). The inverse triggers may be derived symmetrically by approximating (ñ 1 ; x) around n 1 = X 1 (x):
Again, optimality implies the …rst two terms in the expansion are zero. Setting (ñ 1 ; x) = C yields the stated inverse triggers in (31).
To complete the proof, de…ne the …rm's objective function, gross of the adjustment cost, by (n; x) pxF (n) wn+ R (ñ; x 0 ) dG (x 0 jx). Note that (ñ 1 ; x) = (X 1 (x) ; x) (ñ 1 ; x). It follows that 11 (ñ 1 ; x) = nn (ñ 1 ; x), and that
By optimality, we know that n (X 1 (x) ; x) 0. It follows that nn (X 1 (x) ; x)
Thus, we can rewrite (34) as
Recalling from above that 11 (ñ 1 ; X (ñ 1 )) = nn (ñ 1 ; X (ñ 1 )), noting that
, and evaluating at x = X (ñ 1 ) yields
which implies that (ñ) = X 0 (ñ) (X (ñ)), as required.
Lemma 2 To a …rst-order approximation around C = 0, the optimal labor demand policy coincides with its myopic ( = 0) counterpart.
Proof of Lemma 2. Fix next period's aggregate state 0 . In what follows, we show that the stated result holds for any given realization of 0 . We seek to show that the expected future value of the …rm R (ñ; x 0 ; 0 ) dG (x 0 jx) is independent of n to a …rst-order approximation around C = 0 for all 0 . To begin, partition the forward value into parts associated with each of the three continuation regimes-…ring, inaction, and hiring:
For ease of exposition, the remainder of the proof suppresses the dependence on 0 . Di¤eren-tiating, using the value-matching conditions in (6) to eliminate the derivatives of the limits of integration, (3) to substitute for 0 1 (ñ; x 0 ), and denoting D (ñ; x) R 1 (ñ; x 0 ) dG (x 0 jx) yields the recursion:
It is straightforward to show that the latter is a contraction mapping in D, and therefore that there exists a unique …xed point. The mapping depends implicitly on the adjustment cost C via the adjustment triggers, L (ñ) and U (ñ). We now show that, for small C, D (ñ; x) 0 -current employment has no …rst-order implication for the expected value of the …rm. Consider a …rst-order approximation to D (ñ; x) around the frictionless (C = 0) case,
The leading term D (ñ; x)j C=0 = 0-in the absence of an adjustment friction, the …rm's problem is static. From equation (38) the derivative, D C (ñ; x), is given by the recursion
We conjecture that D C (ñ; x)j C=0 = 0, and con…rm that the latter recursion (40) veri…es this conjecture when evaluated at C = 0. Under the conjecture, the approximation (39) implies that D (ñ; x) 0. From the …rst-order condition (5) for an adjusting …rm, this in turn implies the simple approximate labor demand rule, pxF n (n) w. Therefore, the policy function is given by X(n) w=[pF n (n)]. Substitution into the recursion for D C (ñ; x) (40) then implies
Now consider the triggers, L(ñ) and U (ñ). Using equation (30) from Lemma 1, and their 39 By the Implicit Function Theorem on Banach spaces, D is di¤erentiable with respect to C for C > 0. The nontrivial task is to evaluate this derivative in the limit, C ! 0.
derivatives, we can write
Continuity of the density of idiosyncratic shocks g ( jx) implies that the …rst line converges to zero as C ! 0. It follows that the conjecture is con…rmed, D C (ñ; x)j C=0 = 0.
Remark 1 The proof of Lemma 2 generalizes that given in Gertler and Leahy (2008) , but the mechanism behind it is similar. In Gertler and Leahy, there is always a strictly positive probability that a …rm will wish to …re next period and a strictly positive probability that it will wish to hire next period: The …rm's current choice of n may be too high, or too low, relative to next period's desired level of employment. In expectation, the negative marginal value of labor in the latter case cancels the e¤ect of the positive marginal value of labor in the former. This is the same idea behind the result in Lemma 2-it is why changing current employment has no e¤ect, to a …rst order, on the expected future value of the …rm (D (ñ; x) 0).
Lemma 3 The evolution of the density of idiosyncratic productivity conditional on lagged employment satis…es the dynamic equation
where 1 Pr [n 1 =ñ 2 ] is the probability of not adjusting last period. If g is analytic, the law of motion preserves analyticity of G 0 .
Proof of Lemma 3. First note that we may write G (xjn 1 ) = R G (xjx 1 ) dG (x 1 jn 1 ), where
Pr 
In the event that the …rm adjusted last period, n 1 6 =ñ 2 , we know that the …rm would have adjusted so that x 1 = X (n 1 ). Thus,
Pr [x 1 jn 1 ; n 1 6 =ñ 2 ] = 1 [ X (n 1 )] :
In the case in which the …rm did not adjust last period, we know n 2 . That information alone implies that x 1 will be distributed according to the c.d.f of x 1 jn 2 , which denote by G 1 , the lagged counterpart of G. In addition, however, we also know that n 1 =ñ 2 . This implies that x 1 2 [L (n 1 ) ; U (n 1 )], but is otherwise uninformative on the distribution of x 1 . Thus,
De…ning
we can therefore write
(48) Substituting into the de…nition of G (xjn 1 ) yields its dynamic update equation,
That the latter preserves analyticity of G follows from analyticity of G, the fact that sums, products and integrals of analytic functions are themselves analytic, and that quotients of analytic functions with a non-zero denominator are also analytic.
Proof of Proposition 2. We seek to prove that @ [ h (ñ)] =@Cj C=0 = 0. To that end, recall the law of motion for the density of employment h (n), which we rewrite here as
Taking the previous period's density of employment h 1 ( ) as predetermined, we conjecture that @G=@Cj C=0 = 0, and con…rm that this is so later in the proof. Note from the proof of Proposition 1 that, since H ( j ) = R 0 G 0 ( j~ ) g( ) dH 1 (~ ), it follows that @H=@Cj C=0 = 0 under the conjecture. In addition, from Lemma 2 we know that @X=@Cj C=0 = 0. Given the conjecture we can therefore write the derivative of the law of motion (50) 
From Lemmas 1 and 3, in the neighborhood of C = 0 we can write the latter as
It follows that @G=@Cj C=0 = 0, as required.
Lemma 4
In the presence of a size-dependent adjustment cost, C (x) = cR (x), where R (x) is a smooth increasing function, the adjustment triggers L (ñ 1 ) < U (ñ 1 ) are approximately symmetric about the reset policy X (ñ 1 ) for second-order small c.
Proof of Lemma 4. Mirroring the proof of Lemma 1, we take a second-order approximation to the gross return to adjusting (ñ 1 ; x) and the cost of adjustment C (x) around x = X (ñ 1 ). Noting that, as in Lemma 1, optimality dictates that (ñ 1 ; X (ñ 1 )) =
x (ñ 1 ; X (ñ 1 )) 0, we may write:
where d x X (ñ 1 ) is the gap between the adjustment triggers and the reset policy. Note that C (X (ñ 1 )) = cR (X (ñ 1 )), C 0 (X (ñ 1 )) = cR x (X (ñ 1 )), and C 00 (X (ñ 1 )) = cR xx (X (ñ 1 )). Substituting and solving yields: d cR x (X (ñ 1 )) q c 2 R x (X (ñ 1 )) 2 + 2 [ xx (ñ 1 ; X (ñ 1 )) cR xx (X (ñ 1 ))] cR (X (ñ 1 )) xx (ñ 1 ; X (ñ 1 )) cR xx (X (ñ 1 ))
:
For second-order small c = " 2 , the latter becomes
It follows that the adjustment triggers are symmetric about the reset policy for second-order small c. Fixed cost
